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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Rosetta Stone's Motion for Sanctions seeks to covert an innocent discovery error by
Goog~e

into a win "on the merits" for Rosetta Stonc. Such a drastic sanction is particularly

unwarramed here, where Rosetta Stone's claims of prejudice are predicated On its argument that
Google's belated production provides the first "explicit support" for what Rosetta Stone had
"inferred."

Rosetta Stone ties this perceived prejudice to the question "Who, if anybody ,

explicitly endorsed this listing?" Rosetta Stone does not attempt to explain why this particular
question is any more illuminating to it than the exact same quesrion identified as part of
Gocgle's trademark experiment design, which is found literally in the: very first document in
Google's production, which was made on December 23, 2009.
prejudice is
,.
!

t~us

Rosetta Stone's claim of

enrirdy unfounded.

Rosetta Stone's argument

tha~

"Google's conduct reflects bad faith" based on Google's

earlier representation that it had conducted a reasonably diligent search and produced all
responsive documents rings similarly hollow. As set forth in the accompanying declarations of
Google's in-house discovery counsel and the two Quinn Emanuel partners who participated in
discovery matters, Google' s document collection effons were sufficient to identify the
responsive documents and Google and its counsel had a good faith belief that the responsive

documents were among the more than 88,900 documents (not pages) produced. It turned out,
however, that due to a miscommunication with outside contract attorneys who preliminarily

reviewed the documents for production, a certain group of documents were coded in a way that
led them not to be produced. Upon discovering that error, Google had QUiIUl Emanuel review all

the documents in that select group and the slIIalI group (fewer than 20), which had not been
produced, will be produced

immin~ntly.

None of these warrants the sanction.s Rosetta Slone
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seeks either.
This inadvertent error should also be considered in the context of Rosetta Stone having
represented to Googlo on February 24;2010 that it had completed its production of responsive
documents, only to later produce thousands of pages of documents through at least five of their
subsequent productions-frequently on the "eve of the deposition they most related to, or, in a
number of cases, after it.

Although these late productions imposed significant challenges to

Google in the middle of whirlwind depositions, Google chose to stay focused on the merits,
negotiate the issues as best as it could with opposing counsel, and not seek judicial relief.
Under these circumstances, there is no reason to sanctIon Google, which acted in good

f<lith. There is especially no reason to impose the counter-factual judicial detennination Rosetta
Stone seeks. In addition, a sanction here would discourage litigants from trying to litigate on the
merits and instead invite games of discovery "gotcha" in an attempt to obtain through

unintentional error what could not be won on the law and actual facts.

BACKGROUND .
Google has provided extensive discovery in response to Rosetta Stone' bro2.d disclosure

requests, producing nearly 90,000 documents. Declaration of Margret Caruso ("Caruso DecL'),
at

1 3.

Google and its outside counsel worked closely togetl-Jer and were in regular contact

throughout the discovery period so as to ensure collection, review and production of responsive

documents, includinll documents produced in response to the Court's February 4, 2010 Order.'

Id. at

~~

I

4, 9-10; Declaration of lonathan Oblak ("Oblak Decl."), at

~

3; Declaration of Kris

rn providing certain factual infonnation I:cgarding its document collection and review

process, Google does not intend to and does not waive any appJicable work product or attorney

client privilege.

2
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Brewer ("Brewer Dec I."), at ~'1 3, 8.

Google and its outside counsel have engaged in

considerable efforts to meet these obligations. ]d.
Throughout discovery, it has always been GoogJe 's intention to produce documents

relating to Google's 2004 trademark experiments. Caruso Decl., at

~

18; Brewer DecL, at , 10.

Google=s first production to Rosetta Stone in Decemb.er 2009 included documents relating to

those experiments - in fact the very first document produced by Google included a summary of
the design of one of the 2004 experiments ai1.d a template for survey questions. Caruso Decl., ilt
~7 ,

Ex. I.
Following the Coun's February 4, 2010 Order, Google and its outside counsel worked to

collect and produce of document" addressed by that Order. and also investigated specific

inquiries by Rosetta Stone. Caruso Decl ., at

~~

9-12; Brewer Decl., at

~14-6.

Google produccd

at least 35,000 additional documents in response to the Court's Order. including a large volume

!

of trademark complaints and various other categories of documents (ordered documents relating
to eBay. responsive board meeting minutes, ordered documents relating to the American Airlines
case) for which Google and its outside counsel had coordinlited specific collection and

production efforts. Caruso Decl., at ,/10; Brewer Decl., at

~

4. Google and its outside counsel

specifically investigated discovery inquiries included in Rosetta Stone's letters of February 22

and March 8, 20 I 0, and confirmed their belief, honestly held al the time, that the categories
described in the letter of lonathan Oblak dated March 10, had been produced or were in the
process of being produced., and that Google had complied fully with their discovery obligations
and the Court's Order. Oblak Decl., at ~ 3; Caruso Decl., at ~ II; Brewer Decl.,

at~

6_

1n preparing Google's opposition to Rosetta Stone's panial summary judgment motion ,
Google's counsel sought to review documents relating to the 2004 trademark experiments .

3
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Caruso Decl., at ~ 12. Believing they had been produced, but hoping to locate them as quickly as
possible, counsel for requested copies of the survey questionnaires for the experiments directly
from Google. [d.; Brewer Dec\., at

~

7. Counsel believed that the quickest w.y to find the

production copies of the documents would be to first obtain copies from Google. [d. \\o'hen

summary judgment papers were prepared for submission, it became apparent that 11 documents
had not, in fact, been produced. [d.

Google's outside counsel prepared the documents for

production on April 8, and some were attached to

a~

Apri I 9 declaration submitted in support of

Google's opposition to Rosetta Stone's motion for partial summary judgment. Caruso Decl., at "if
13; Brewer Decl., at

~

7. While it was intended that the 11 documents would be produced by

April 9, they were not produced until April 14, when Rosella Stone's counsel advised that they
had not all been disclosed and Google immediately produced them. Caruso Dec\., at ~ 14.
Upon discovering that the 11 trademark experiment documents ultimately produced on
April 14 had not been produced in Googlels original production. and in tight of the fact that
Google had always intended to produce these documents. GoogJe and its outside counsel
investigated the cause for the omission. Caruso Dec!., at

~

15; Brewer DecL, at fS. Google's

outside counsel concluded on April 16 that the cause of the error was a miscorrununication
between outside counsel and the contract review attorneys. Caruso Decl .. at ~ 16; Brewer Dec!.,
'at

fI

9. Although the documents had been collected and reviewed, they were miscoded and

in<;luded in a category that was not to be produced, even though they had also been coded in a
category for production. ]d. This conflict was not detected during the regular spot checking of
the attorney coding. Jd. Following this dlscovery, Google's counse! directed the re-review of

the documents that had been given conflicting codes. Caruso Decl., at ,/17. Working as quickly
as possible, outside counsel identified an additional responsive documents that are being

4
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{

prepared for production today. !d. In total, Google has produced less than 20 new documents.

Id.
At all times, Google and iLS outside counsel intended to comply fully with their discovery
obligations and this Court's orders, jncluding intending to produce the documents relating to the
2004 trademark experiments as well as the· other

respo~sivc

documents identified in its recent

investigation. At no time did Google or its outside counsel intentionally wiihho ld or omlt from
production any document it agreed to produce or was ordered produce. Caruso Decl., at

~

18;

Brewer Decl., at 11 JO.

ARGUMENT

1.

THE INNOCENT MISTAKE AT ISSUE DOES NOT MEET THE STAl'<l)ARD
TO IMPOSE SANCTIONS

Rosetta Stone correctly states the standard for determining whether sanctions should be
issued, but it misapplies the facts. In the Fourth Circuit, Courts should consider four factors in
detennining whether to issue sanctions: (1) whether the non-complying party acted in bad faith:
(2) the amount of prejudice that noncompliance caused the adversary. (3) the need for deterrence
of the particular sort of fion-compliance, and (4) whether less drastic sanctions would have been
effective_ Bizprolink, LLC v. America Onli/le. Inc_, 140· Fed. Appx. 459, 463-64 (4th Cir. 2005);

Belk v. Chllrlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. oj Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 348 (4th Cir. 2001). Rosetta Stone

cannot show that, under the circumstances present here, the requested sanctions are appropriate.
A-

Google Did Not Act in Bad Faith_

Rosetta Stone's assertion of bad faith is based on nothing more than unsupported
innuendo and speculation. As set forth in the declarations submitted herewith, both Google end
its outside counsel believed that

.n responsive documents relating to the Google experiments had

5
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been produced, and took exhaustive steps to try to locate responsive documents during the course
of discovery. Oblak Decl., at 1[3; Caruso Decl., at ~ 11; Brewer Decl., at ~ 6.
Google's good faith is evident from the fact that it agreed to produce the most salacious
documents concerning the 2004 trademark experiment documents voluntarily, before Rosetta

Stone filed its motion to compel the January 8, 2010 .. In fact, at the time of Rosetta Stone' s
motion Google had already begun producing documents relating to the Google trademark
ex.periments, one of which was the very first document produced by Google. Caruso Decl., at ~
7, Ex. 1.

Cleary. Google was not seeking to hide documents relating to its trademark

experiments. Instead, the late production of documents was the result of a misunderstanding
with the outside contract attorneys who conducted the preliminary review of Google's collected

documents. Google took seriously the Court' s February 4, 2010 order, and produced more than
35,000 documents in response thereto. Caruso Decl., at

~

10; Brewer Decl., at

~

4. When

Rosetta Stone inquired about spec ific categories, Google investigated and responded to those
inquiries and believed those responses to be accurate. Caruso Dec1-, at ~ 11; Brewer Decl., at ~
5. That Google subsequently discovered documents [hat are cumulative and/or large ly irrelevant

is not a basis to call into question the good faith or diligence of its entire discovery efforts.
Notwithstanding Rosetta Stone's conclusory allegations, this inadvertent error does not.

rise to the level of conduct necessary to demonstrate bad faith. Haney v. Woodward & Lothrop,

In.c., 330 F.2d 940, 946 (4th Cir. 1964) (counsel's mistake in not turning over documents did not
justify severe sanction); DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp ., 506 F.2d 781, 790 (3d Cir. 1974)
(counsel's mistaken interpretation of law did not constitute bad faith); Jacobs v. Scribner, 2009
WL 3157533, at *15 (E.D.Cal. 2009) (denying sanctions motion because mistake did not
constitute bad faith).

6
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Finally, Rosetta Stone's suggestions of bad faith are particularly misplaced glven its own
discovery failings _ Rosetta Stone's conduct and the timing of many significant disclosures could
just as easily support the same innuendo cast at Google_ If Rosetta Stone's position

i~

that no

party is pennitted to rn2ke an honest mistake, then it should justify its own before casting Slanes
at Google.

Rosetta Stone repeatedly produced responsive (and in some cases highly relevant
documents) late in the discovery process and long after having represented that its document
production on key issues had been complete. Oblak Decl.. at ~ 6.

For ex-ample. Rosetta Stone first disclosed virtually all of itS purported evidence of
"actual confusion" either during or after the deposition of its 30(b)(6) witnesses on {he topic,

Oblak Decl., at ~~ 8-9. Although Google sought disclosure of Rosetta Stone's actua l confus ion

evidence in its very first disclosure requests, i'neluding interrogatories to which Rosetta Stone
responded on November 23, 2009, Rosetta Stone flISt disclosed its confusion witnesses three

months later during the deposition of Van Leigh, its 30(b)6 witness. Id. Mr. Leigh, however,

knew nothing more than that confusion witness had bee-n identified. Id."
Rosetta Sto~e later provided a supplemental 30(b)6 witnesses on the topic, as Google had
requested, but he was designated as such during the lunch break of his deposition. Oblak Decl.,
at

~1

10-11. At the time, Rosetta Stone had still not disclosed any documents concerning its

confusion witnesses or L1e process undertaken to identify them_ ld. at ~ 13_ Further, the witness
testified that he had completed his investigation to identify potential confusion witnesses in

..

December 2009 and turned the results over to Rosetta Stone's legal department. [d., at

~~

12-13 .

Yet Rosetta Stone did not disclose its actual confusion witnesses until two months later and just
three weeks before the close of discovery. Id. The timing of these disclosures was highly

7
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questionable and raises all types of questions about Rosetta Stone's diligence in compl.)6ng with
its discovery obligations.

Several other instances gave rise to legitimate questions regarding Rosetta Stone's
diligence. Mr. Leigh also tesrified about responsive emai]s that he had not provided to counsel
for production, and another executive testified that he had never been instructed to preserve any
documents and had, in fact, routinely destroyed responsive documents after Rosetta Stone's filed
its complaint. [d., at ~ 17.

Rpsetta Stone also made other substantial late productions.

.~,fter

representing on

February 24., 2010 that it was 'Cnot currently aware of any categories of discoverable documents

responsive to Google's First Set of Document Requests," Rosetta Stone made at least five
productions of documents, substantial portions. of which were responsive to Google's first
document requests. Id., at

~

6. These documents were pJainly responsive to Google's first

document requests because when Rosetta Stone supplemented its original

interrogator~

responses after the dose of discovery It identified . thousands of pages from those later
productions. ld.
Several specific late disclosures were notable. Just three days before the deposition of its
enforcement manager, Rosella Stone produced thousands of pages of documents from his files,
leaving little time to review and prepare them for his deposition; an additional production of his
material followed a week after his deposition. [d., ~ [4.

Finally, Rosetta Stone made a substantial production of documents on March 15,2010,

after the close of discovery - approximately 7,500 documents - many of which were admittedly
responsive to Google's original document requests, as evinced by their being referenced

In

supplemental responses to Google's original interrogatories. !d., ~ 14.

8
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In short, Rosetta Stone's innuendo and speculation as to Googie's bad faith

lS

undermined by its own conduct in discovery_

B.

Rosetta Sto ne Can not Show P rej udice .

. Rosetta Stone's ccntention that it has been prejudiced by the late-production of
documen~

is without basis. Rosetta Stone has had for months. the actual results of the Google

trademark experiments as wet! as evidence of the overall survey design and types of questions.
Moreover, notwithstanding Rosetta . Stone's protestations about the

importance of the

experiments, they are in fact irrelevant and prejudicial and should be excluded . . None of the

Google trademark experiments, or other studies by Google examining customer perceptions of
sponsored link advertisements. are relevant to whether there is a likeJihood of confusion as to

Rosetta Stone's trademarks. As to other miscellaneous documents identified by Google, those
documents are large ly cumulative of, consistent with, and/or tangential to Google's earlier

i

'.

document production.
1.

Google prod uced the results of its trademark expe riments at the
outset.

Rosetta Stone also suffered no prejudice from the late production of additional documents

regarding the Goagle trademark experiments because it has had the results of those experiments,
as well as numerous documents discussing them, since before depositions began. Rosetta Stone

has not only had sufficient opportunity to develop. record regarding the experiments, it has
ex,tensively used in its motion practice the best "evidence" for it that those documents yield. See

e.g.,

Dk~.

104 at 7; Dkt. 148 at 2. That the production of some peripheral infonnation that was

inadvertently delayed does not prejudice Rosetta Stone.

9
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Google's trademark
andlor irrelevant

experime~t

documents are cumu lative

Very little of the infonnation conta!ned in the post-March 15 documents concerning the
2004 trademark studies provides significant insight into the experiments, as earlier productions
and contained the conclusions of the ,tudies, rhe data collected from the studies, and the srudy
methods. Caruso Decl., at ~ 18. Although the newly-identified documents were used in the

srudies themselves. such as ind ividual questiormaires and charts indicating the order of the
questions, they provide minimal additional information, and mainly serve to reinforce that that
the 2009 trademark policy was not tested in 2004.
ii

Rosetta Stone cannot show prejudice

Rosetta Stone's attempts to demonstrate prejudice are either entirely generalized or

misstate the record. Rosetta Slone theorizes tha,t it might have used these

doc~ents

in its

30(b)6 deposition on the experiments, or when drafting its summary judgment opposition and
opposition to Google's motion to strike its survey expert. Motion for Sanctions at 8-10. These
conc1usory arguments do not support a finding of prejudice. Nor do Rosetta Stone's mOre
specific claims of prejudice bear out.
Rosetta Stone contends that it could have used certain of the documents producl!:d to rebut
attacks on the adequacy of Rosetta Stone's consumer confusion study by showing that Google's
.trademark studies questioned perceived "endorsemenr" by the trademark owner. Ivlotion for
lt

Sanctions at 9. Yet the fact that "endorsement questions were used in the Google experiments
is clearly reflected on the documents produced on December 23, 2009. Oblak DecL, at 11 19, Ex.

l4.

Rosetta Stone cannot serious contend that not having access to the question "Who, if

anybody, explicitly endorsed this listingT Motion for Sanctions at 9, would have been materially
more helpful to it than having of a document reflecting the survey questiolL Caruso Decl.,

~

7,

10
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Ex. 1. The

"endors~menf'

question was not new. Moreover. Gaogle's challenge of Dr. Van

Liere's "endorsement" question was based on his use of that undefined tenn in connection with
advertisers who had an actual commercial relationship with Rosetta Stone, such as Amazon. an
authorized resellcr, and Coupon Cactus, an authorized premium affiliate at the time Google
displayed the advertisement used by Dr. Van Liere.

Dkt 131.

Goog/e's conducting of

trademark experimenis six years ago regarding perceived endorsement withoUl regard to the
commercia 1 relationship between the advertiser and trademark owner cannot justify or excuse
Rosetta Stone's expert's failure to use proper methodology in this case. Dkt 120; Dkt 148.

Rosetta Stone also asserts that certain of the new documents refute GoogJe's claims that
the 2004 experiments did not test its 20Q9 trademark policies. Motion for Sanctions at R. To

support this argument, Rosetta Stone points to the fact that some of the ads used in the
experiment include reseUer ads. [d. at 8-9. Rosetta Stone ignores, however, that the sample ads

also include ads of where a company uses its competitors trademarks !n the ad text. The
presence of competitor tradema-k ads proves the fallacy of Rosetta Stone's position. Google's
2009 trademark policy does not pennit such ads. But .it is not necessary to look to the late
produced documents to prove this point - the trademark experiment documents produced
previously expressly state the ex.perimentaJ conditions tested, and the limitations on trademark
usage in ad text present in the 2009 trademark pclicy are not tested in the 2004 experiments .
..:..

Oblak Dec!., at 1i 19, Ex 14;

~

20, Ex. 15. Thus, the new disclosures do not show that the 2004

experiments tested the policy implemented in 2009. Instead, they, like the documents previously

disclosed, show the oppos ite.
2.

The Google experiments are irrelevant and subject to exclusion.

As explained in Google's Motion in Limine, Google's 2004 trademark experiments are
irrelevant to whether Google's use of the Rosetta Stone mark creates a likelihood of consumer

11
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confusion, are unduly prejudicial, and should be excluded. Diet. 190 at 13-1 5. Rosetta.Stone
cannot have been prejudiced by the late disclosure of evidence that should ultimately be
excluded at trial.
The 2004 trademark experiments do not measure consumer response to ads using Rosetta
Stone's trademarks, which were not used in the experiments in any respect. As noted above,

"detenr,ining the likelihood of confusion is an 'inherently factual' issue that depends on the facts
and circumst<::nces in each case." Lone Star Sreakhouse & Saioon, in.c. y. Alpha oj Va., Inc., 43

F.3d 922, 933 (4th Cir. 1995). As Rosetta Stone must concede, the 2004 trademark experiments
do not replicate the use of Rosetta Stone's marks, and on that basis alone should be excluded.

THOIP v. Walt Disney Co., 2010 WL 447049, "14 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 2010) (excluding a survey
that "failed to sufficiently replicate the manner in which consumers encountered the parties'

products in the marketplace"); Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke. Inc., S2S F. Supp. 2d 558, 592
(S.D .N.Y. 2007) ("A survey That uses a stimulus that makes no attempt to replicate how [he
madcs are viewed by consumers in real life may be excluded on that ground alone.") (citing

American Footwear Corp. v. Gen. Footwear Co. , 609 F.2d 655, 661 n.4 (2d Cir. 1979); Simon
Prop. Group L.P. v. mySimon. Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1052 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
The 2004 trademark experiments are also not probative of willfulness.

Whatever

conclusions were drawn in each ex.periment, there is no experiment as a whole that tests anything
like what became Google's 2009 trademark policy. Oblak Decl., at

~

19, Ex 14;

~

20, Ex. IS.

None of the studies impose the types of limitations present in the 2009 trademark policy, id.,
which permits only limit~d use of trademark terms in text. 2 The most that can be said of the

2 Under the 2009 policy, in addition to the brand owner and its authorized licensees, the
only advertisers who would be permitted to include the trademark in ad text are those which: (1)
actually resell legitimate products bearing the trademark; (2) sell components, replacement parts
(footnote continued)

12

6991

2004 experiments is thst unrestricted use of trademark terms in ad text may cause confusion.
But that, of course, is not and never has been Google's policy. So the results of the 2004
trademark experiments cannot be used to demonstrate that Google had willfully infringed when

it changed its trademark policies five years later after having deve loping an automated system to
check whether certain aspects of its tradeI"):13.rk policies were being adhe red to by advertisers
(technology unavailable to Google in 2004). Id.

Finally, just

~

courts exclude as unduly prejudicial flawed irE-demark studies relating

che actual trad2.mark at issue in the

litigation~

(0

Google's 2004 trademark experiments should be

excluded because they do not relate to Rosetta Stone's trademark and do' not test actual ads run
under the current trademark policy-i.e .• market conditions. See, e.g., Starter Corp. v. Converse,

Inc., 170 F.3d 286, 297 (2d Cir. 1999) (affinning exclusion of survey as unfairly prejudicial
because survey was of little value); Vista Food Exchang2, Inc. v. Vistar Corp .• 2005 WL

(

2371958 , at '7 (E.D.N. Y. Sept. 27,2005) (excluding survey as unfairly prejudicial because it did
not correctly identify universe, used too small of a sample~ failed to replicate market conditions,
and failed to use a control product).

3.

Other

late~produced

do.cuments a re cumulative or irrelevant.

In addition to the handful of documents re1ating to the 2004 trademark experim ents,
Google identified a few other documents for production. All 3rc cumulative of documents
produced previously and/or oflittle or no probative value.

Google!s new sponsored link documents are cumulative and
are irrelevant
Google identified a few new documents relating to studies it conducted regarding
or compatible products corresponding to the trademark; or (3) provide non-competitive
infonnation about the goods or services corresponding to the trademark tenn to use the tenn in
ads. Oblak Decl., ~ 18 Ex. 13.
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customer perception of sponsored link advertisements ("sponsored I ink experiments"). Caruso
Decl., ~ 18. One study, for example, examined ad format to consider consumer responses to the
length of the ad and the number of ads that appear that the top of the page. Id. These types of
concerns do not relate to Rosetta Stone's claims regarding consumer confusion . Indeed, the

sponsored link experiments should be excluded because of the potential for undue prejudice that
might arise from the introduction of an additional, but irrelevant, question of confusion. See,

e.g.. Dkt. 190 at 13-15.

In other words, studies regarding consumer perception of the

Googie.com results page or sponsored link advertisements might cause confusion among the
jurors regarding what type of confusion is relevant. Here, only trademark confusion is relevant,

which the new sponsored link documents do not address.
ii

The third-party working paper is irrelevant

Google identified one new document that is a "Working Paper» of an org~nization called
the "Net Institute." Caruso Decl., at

~

18. \Vhile responsive to Rosetta Stone's broad discovery

requests, this academic study of search e.nglne advert~sing, which was not cond~cted by, or for,
Google, has scant, if any, probative value here. The paper does not attempt to measure consumer
confusion, in relation to trademarks or otherwise. It is also publicly available at, among other
sites: htto:IJ"vww.netinst.orglGllose- Yang 07-35.pdf.
iii

Google's new BarnOwl documents are cumulative

Google identified a few documents relating to the implementation of BarnOwl, its
automated filtering system used to measure compliance with the 2009 trademark policy. Caruso
Decl., at

~

18. These documents address generally BarnOwl policy and the potential revenue

impact associated with implementing BarnOwl. and are consistent with the discussion of that
topic in other documents produced previously. One of the documents, for example, adds three

additional lines to an email chainthatwaspreviouslyproducedandattachesadocument.ld.

14
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Although a dupl icate of the attachment was previously produced, Google \yill produce this
version of the otherwise identical document so that the metadata associating [he email with

document is available. !d.

•

•

•

In sum, these documents, while technically "new," are irrelevant andicr cumu lative.
There is no prejudice to Rosetta Stone from their la[e production and no basis to impose any
sanction.
C.

Google's Inadvertent Error Does Not Require Deterrence.

There is no need to sanction Google m deter similar conduct. Google's conduct was not.
intentional. In the instant action, the failure to produce documents

so~ner

was caused by an

unfortunate review and production error rather than an explicit or intentional disregard of the

(

Court's instructions. Because Google endeavored to comply with the Coun's order, the error
was inadvertent, and Google promptly remed ied the mistake, there is no intentional behavior to
deter. Admittedly, GoogJe did not attempt to review every single document in the company or
start its collection efforts from scratch aner receiving the Coun's order. Not only did Rosetta
Stone's counsel admit to Google's Counsel that no such action was expected, but such efforts
would not have been necessary becal!se Google had collected the documents in question. The
fai lure to produce fewer than 20 documents out of nearly 90,000 responsive, substantive
documents was a mista..'<:e, but net one deserving of Court-imposed deterrence.

D.

If Any Sanction Should Issue, Less Drastic Sanctions Are Appropriate.

"The purpose of the discovery process is to allow both parties to be prepared for any
evidence that will be put forward at trial," not to adjudicate the merits of the case. Bizpro/ink.

LLC v. America Online, Inc., 140 Fed. AppK. 459, 463-64 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing

u.s.

v. Procter

(
15
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& Gambie Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)). There is a strong presumption against sanctions that

decide the issues of. case. Poulis v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863 (3d Cir. 1984)
Consequently, a callrt should issue the least drastic sanction available that would still be
effective.' T-Zikssari v. Glendening, 1995 WL 371666, at *4 (4th Cir. June 21, 1995)
(Overturning district court's sanction as too "harsh" because, inter alia, "the proper sanction
must be no more severe than is necessary to prevent prejudice to the defendants").

This

approach strikes the proper balance between "preserving the right of district courts to enforce
their discovery orders" while simultaneously allowing

"t~e

merits of the damage claim to be

adjudicated in the proper fnmm at trial, rather than in the context of a discovery dispute"

Bizprolink, 140 Fed. Appx. at 464.
1.

Documents do not support Rosetta Stone's requested sanction.

While unwarranted under any authority, Rosetta Stone's requested relief is particularly
inappropriate hecause Google's 2004 trademark experiments do not measure confusion as to the

Rosetta Stone trademarks or Google's 2009 policy. Nor do they provide evidence that confusion
is likely under Google's 2004 trademark policy relating to key words. The newly produced

trademark experiment documents do nor support a finding that there was a "high likelihood" of
confusion as to any and all use of trademarks in ad text, under any circumstances, for all time.

A court that issues potentially dispositive sanctions is subject to closer scrutiny than
the general abuse of discretion standard used for non-dispositive sanctions. Truell \~. Regent
University School of Law, 2006 ',IlL 2076769, at *2 (E.D.Va. 2006) (citing Wilson v. Volkswagen
of Am., inc., 561 F.2d 494,503 (4th Cir. 1977); Peltz v. Moretti, 292 Fed. Appx.. 475 (6th Cir.
2008) (Because the deeming of facts established satisfies the elements necessary to deteamine
outcome of case, circuit court reviowed the decision using t!J.e high standard required for a
sanction of dismissai); )); Knowlton v. Te/trust Phones, Inc., 189 FJd 1177, 1182 n.6 (lOth Cir.
1999)("Deeming the establishment of certain facts under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
37(b)(2)(A) can be tantamount to a default judgment, which in tum triggers a greater degree of
scrutiny.").
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Instead, the new documents confinn. as is apparent from the previously produced documents.

that the scope of the tested specific experimental conditions was markedly ditTerent from
Google's 2009 trademark policy. Se2 e.g. Oblak Dec\., at ~ 19, Ex 14; ~ 20, Ex. 15.
In short, the "established fact" requested by Rosetta Stone is a fiction - a contrived
attempt to convert the 2Q04 trad~mark expeiiments into.something they are not and shield them

from legitimate and highly probative criticisms - criticisms that could be made even without the
newly produced trademark -experiment docurr.ents. The 2004 trademark experiments do not test

the 2009 trademark policy. If the results of the experiments are admitted at all, the jury should
be entitled to hear why the experiments do not measure or predict consumer response to the 2009

trademark policy.
2.

Rosetta Stone's requested sanction seeks to unfairly stack the deck.

Rosetta Stone asks the Court «take as established for purposes of this action" that
,.

\

Google's 2004 studies concluded that use of a trademark in either the body or title of an ad
results in a "high like lihood of consumer confusion." Motion for Sanctions at 3. Such a sanction
is potentially case dispositive. There is no dispute that, under its 2009 trademark policy. Google

pemlits certain types of advertisers to use third party trademarks in the body or title of a
sponsored link.

Thus, Rosetta Stone envisions a vinually evidence-free path to victory: if

Google's 2004 trademark experiments are deemed to establish that the use of a trademark in ad
te~

results in "high likelihood of consumer confusion," because GoogJe pennits use of

trademarks in ad text (even though limited to, by defmition, fair uses such as reseUers); Google's
trademark policy results in a high likelihood of consumer confusion. This is contrary to the fact
and to tr::!demark law generally.
As discussed above, no sanction is appropriate uQder these circumstances_ However, if

one were, such an extreme sanction as Rosetta Stone seeks cannot be )ustified. It is axiomatic
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that case dispositive sanctions are the harshest possible and should be avoided jf a lesser sanction
is equally as effective. T-Zikssari v. Glendening, 1995 WL 371666, at *4 (4th Cir. June 21 ,
1995) (overturning district court's sanction as too "harsh" because, inter alia, "the proper
sanction must be no more severe than is necessary to prevent prejudice to

Sawyers v. Big Lots Stores, inc., 2009

wi.

t.~e

defendants");

55004, at "3 (W.D. Va. Jan. 8, 2009) (limiting

evidence used at trial is more tailored and thus more appropriate sanction than dismissal). A
case dispositive sanctions also requires a showing of wilifiJlness, bad faith, or fault. Pellz, 292

Fed. Appx. at 478 (a case dispositive sanction "in discovery is a sanction of last resort that may
be imposed only if the court concludes that a party's failure to cooperate in discovery is due to
willfulness, bad faith, or faulr."). Taking a fact as established is considered the equivalent of a
case dispositive sanctio~ if the established facts satisfy virtually all of the eleme~ts of the claim.
JD. Marshall Int 'l, inc. v. Redstort, Inc., 656 F. Supp. 830, 838 (N.D.I11. 1987) (Court ordered
sanction of attorneys fees rather than sanction establishing facts as admitted because latter would

be "unduly harsh despjte the egregious conduct of defendants' counsel" because "such an order
would establish virtually all of the elements of [the) RlCO claim."). Rosetta Stone's pursuit of

such a sanction is entirely baseless.
As discussed above, Googic:: at all times proceeded with discovery in good faith.

Google's delay in disclosing the documents at issue was not willful but rather the result of a
m,ere oversight. Because Google did not act in bad faith the potentially dispositive sanction
proposed by Rosetta Stone is unwarranted and a lesser sanction, if any. would be more

appropriate. Bizprolink. LLC v. America Online, Inc. , 140 Fed. Appx. 459, 463-64 (4th Cir.
2005) (District court's dismissal sanction was an abuse of discretion because court found no

evidence of bad faith and a lesser sanction would have

b~en

effective); Estate of Spear

\I.

CIR.,
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41 F.3d 103, 1l6-117 (3rd Cir. 1994) (district court abused its discretion in deeming admitted
certain facts because nO bad faith and lesser sanctions would have "sent the message"); Ali v.

Sims, 788 F.2d 954, 957 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing a sanctio n deer.ling certain facts to be true
because even if there was inexcusable delay, there was no bad faith I no history of di latoriness,
little prejudice from the delay, and less 'severe sanctions were probably available).

To do

otherv/ise: would impose a disproportionate penalty on Google that would effectively prevent its
righ.t to a trial on the merits.
3.

Lesser sanctions are available

Google respectfully submits that no sanction is appropriate under these circumstances,
and that the expense and distraction from summary judgment and trial preparation that it has

incurred in responding

to this motion is a morc than adequate deterrent.

Further, GoogJe notes

that given its efforts to adjust to Rosetta Stone's repeatedly late disclosures of documents and

{

witness without resorting to motion practice. any sanction imposed here would encourage
litigants to file motions bru;ed on every delay and perceived slight, if only as insurance against
any inadvertent errors in its own discovery process. Such a result would be at odds with the 'yery
purpose of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provide that they are to be "construed
and administered to secure the just, speedy. and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding." Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
If the Court nonetheless determines that a sanction is appropriate, and that the discovery
error was intentional, and that it was prejudicial to Rosetta Stone, and that there is a need to deter
future inadvertent errors by Google, the sanctions sought by Rosetta Stone are too severe. Lesser

sanctiomi would strike an appropriate balance bet'Ween addressing any prejudice caused by
discovery violations and litigating the case on tho merits. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b){2)(A)(i)-(vii)
provides a non-exclusive sampling of potential alternative sanctions. Less.er available sanctions
19
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include attorneys' fees incurred in connection wit1 motion practice associated with violation. (In
rz Mbakpllo. 1995 WL 224050, at '3 (4th Cir. April 17, 1995», granting a deposilion, (State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. New Horizont, Inc.• 250 F.R.D. 203, 219 CE.D.Pa. 2008», or

excluding late-disclosed exhibits from being offered at trial (Webs£er v. Secretary a/Army. 1991

WL 807, at '2 (4th Cir. Jan. 9, 1991». All of these altematiyes offer a less hazsh, yet effeclive
sanction lhat placates any alleged prejudice suffered by Rosetta Stone while preserving the

merits of the case for triaL

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons. Google respectfully requests that the Court deny Rosetta
Stone's Motion for Sanctions.

Dated: April 21, 2010
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